The 1960s represent an important chapter in U.S. business history, partly because they ushered in a new tactic of corporate combination-the predatory takeover Predatory takeovers not only facilitate the restructuring of corporate enterprises, they also alter the internal structure of the business elite. We explore the factors that led large corporations to be acquired through friendly and predatory means in the 1960s. Consistent with the "embeddedness" perspective, our results indicate that the likelihood of acquisition during this period was influenced by a firm's position in the resource-dependence network of the economy as well as the positions of its managers and directors in the firm's ownership structure and in the social network of the business elite. Specifically, firms run by central managers and directors were less susceptible to predatory takeover-ownership relationships dominated over ties among the business elite. However, consistent with traditional economic accounts, our results suggest that in the 1960s undervaluation of a firm's assets, the ratio of its stock price to earnings, its performance, and its size also influenced the likelihood of acquisition. 
Act of 1950, indirectly promoted diversifying acquisitions by discouraging horizontal and vertical combinations
). Hence, much research on the 1960s wave of acquisitions charts the proliferation of diversifying acquisitions and the resulting conglomerate form as well as revealing the causes and consequences of these strategies and forms (Rumelt 1974; Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987; Fligstein 1990 ).
More interesting to us, however, acquisitions in the 1960s were also distinguished by their conflictive character. Until the midtwentieth century, corporate acquisitions in the United States were typically "friendly" affairs. Although circumstances (e.g., low profitability) sometimes forced weak corporations to combine with dominant ones, acquisitions were usually arranged by the managers of the combining firms. In the 1960s, however, "predatory" acquisitions began to spread. Predatory acquisitions occur when one corporation directly purchases another firm's stock from its shareholders without first approaching the firm's management with a proposal to combine. The spread of predatory acquisitions in the 1960s was largely a result of the emergence of a new entrepreneurial device-the cash interfirm tender offer (Jarrell and Bradley 1980; Pound 1992 ). In such offers, a prospective buyer makes a public pledge to purchase a specified amount of a target firm's stock from any of its holders at a set price, invariably higher than the current market price. Managers of the target firm often resist predatory initiatives-labelling them "hostile." Predatory acquisitions proliferated during the 1970s and 1980s and are now common. Hirsch (1986) characterizes the emergence of such acquisitions as a challenge to the normative structure of business practice-a tactic championed by upstart business elites who differ in social, religious, and geographic origins from their more established corporate adversaries. Chandler (1990) considers the 1960s a major turning point in U.S. business history, partly because of the spread of predatory acquisitions. The proliferation of predatory acquisitions created a market for the transfer of corporate control, and the "market for corporate control . . . facilitated the ease with which the modern industrial enterprise could be restructured ... [such that] firms could be bought, sold, split up, and recombined in ways that would have been impossible before" (Chandler 1990: 626) .
We investigate the factors that led corporations to welcome friendly acquisitions or to succumb to predatory takeovers in the 1960s. We evaluate the relative merits of explanations of corporate acquisitions that emphasize social embeddednesss as compared to economic explanations, including agency theory. We formulate these explanations to recognize the special character of the 1960s' wave of acquisitions. As characterized by sociologists, economic explanations assume that firms are homogeneous and autonomous units whose actions are regulated by market competition. In contrast, social embeddedness accounts assume that corporations are differentiated and interconnected units whose actions are regulated by the social relationships in which they and their leaders are situated (Granovetter 1985) . We also assess the relative importance of three different types of social embeddedness for corporate acquisitions: (1) a firm's position in the interindustry resource-dependence network of the economy, (2) the positions of corporate managers and directors in the ownership structure of their firms, and (3) managers' and directors' positions in the social network of the business elite. We are most interested in the roles that the last two types of embeddedness play in corporate acquisitions. In particular, we wish to determine whether established business leaders-those with ownership links to their firms and network ties to other elites-were better able to defend themselves against predatory acquisitions during this period of conflict within the business elite.
SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS AND CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS

Resource-Dependence Relations
The only established embeddedness account of corporate acquisitions focuses on a firm's resource-dependence relations. Burt (1980) proposes a summary indicator of "structural autonomy" to measure the extent to which an industry's corporations are free from resource dependence on other sectors of the economy. Structural autonomy is high (and THE OTHER CONTESTED TERRAIN 471 resource dependence low) when: (1) an industry is oligopolized, (2) firms in the industry transact (as buyers or suppliers) with many other sectors that are highly competitive, and (3) the first two conditions coincide. Burt (1980) maintains that these three conditions provide firms with "the ability to pursue and realize interests without constraint from other actors in the system" (p. 892). Industries exhibiting these conditions thus enjoy high profit margins (Burt 1979 ). Burt also disaggregates his summary indicator of structural autonomy to measure the extent to which industries are free from dependence on other specified sectors. He maintains that the extent to which a firm is constrained by another sector increases its incentive to acquire firms in that sector-acquisitions representing "co-optive relations" that enable firms in one industry to have "some effect on the decisions made" by firms in another industry (Burt 1980:901) . He shows that the number of acquisitions by corporations in one industry of firms in another industry is directly related to the degree to which the latter constrains the former.
In addition, Pfeffer (1972) proposes a measure of the extent to which an industry's corporations experience uncertainty vis-A-vis their competitors. Uncertainty is greatest when an industry's concentration level is intermediate. At low concentration levels, the impact of the average firm in the industry on input and output prices is small. At high levels, the impact of the average constituent is large, but corporations are able to predict, monitor, and even plan according to the buying and selling decisions of the few firms in their industry.' Pfeffer also views acquisitions as co-optive devices for coping with the consequences of resource dependence and shows that the number of acquisitions between firms in an industry is directly related to the extent to which the industry's concentration level deviates from the economy-wide average. Further, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that resource dependence (whether linking competitors or potential transaction partners) may lead corporations to acquire firms in unrelated industries (i.e., firms that are. not their buyers, suppliers, or competitors). Such diversifying acquisitions can reduce a corporation's dependence by decreasing the average concentration of the industries in which it produces or by changing and broadening the range of sectors with which it transacts. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:127) note that diversifying acquisitions are primarily pursued when horizontal acquisitions, linking competitors, and vertical combinations, linking buyers and suppliers, are prohibited.
We extend this line of inquiry, which until now has been conceptualized at the industry level of analysis and has focused on the behavior of acquiring firms, to inform our firmlevel analysis of acquired firms in the 1960s. The resource-dependence perspective implies three relevant dimensions of a potential target corporation's position in the resourcedependence network-the extent to which its industry (1) is structurally autonomous (free from resource dependence vis-h-vis potential transaction partners), (2) constrains firms in other sectors, and (3) is free from competitive uncertainty. In general, we hypothesize that firms in disadvantageous positions in the resource-dependence network will seek or welcome friendly acquisitions while those in advantageous positions will be the target and victim of predatory acquisitions.
Consider potential partners in friendly acquisitions. Corporations in industries with little structural autonomy may have an incentive to seek out and accept the acquisition overtures of other firms. Acquisition can help a corporation reduce constraints imposed by its buyers and suppliers by co-opting potential transaction partners (if the acquirer produces in a linked industry) or by shifting production to industries with less problematic buyers and suppliers (if the acquirer produces in an unrelated industry). Corporations in industries that pose little constraint for other sectors may also have an incentive to seek out and accept the acquisition overtures of other firms. If the capacity to limit other firms' autonomy redounds to a corporation's benefit, corporations that lack this capacity can improve their position, either by being 472 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW acquired by a competitor-thus increasing their industry's concentration level-or by being acquired by a firm in another betterpositioned sector. Finally, corporations producing in competitively uncertain industries may have an incentive to seek out and accept the acquisition bids of other firms. Acquisition can help a corporation reduce the uncertainty imposed by its competitors by co-opting them (if the acquirer produces in the same industry) or by shifting productive activity to industries with less problematic competitors (if the acquirer produces in a different industry). Now consider potential target firms in predatory acquisitions. Corporations that enjoy structural autonomy may be the target of unwanted acquisition bids. Their autonomy provides little incentive to be dissolved into another firm (insofar as autonomy leads to higher profits), and at the same time it provides other firms in less autonomous industries (and who are interested in reducing their dependence) with an incentive to acquire them. Corporations producing in industries that constrain firms in other sectors may also be the target of predatory acquisitions. Their capacity to limit other firms' autonomy diminishes their incentive to be dissolved into another firm, while it acts as a magnet for potential acquirers-firms constrained by them that wish to reduce this constraint, and firms not constrained by them but that wish to obtain the capacity to constrain others. Finally, corporations experiencing little competitive uncertainty may be the target of unwanted acquisition bids. While the certainty of their competitive environment diminishes their incentive to be dissolved into another firm, it may attract the attention of firms in other more competitively uncertain environments.
Although a strict application of resourcedependence theory implies that competitive uncertainty should lead to horizontal acquisitions and buyer-supplier constraint should lead to vertical combinations, we suspect that competitive uncertainty and buyer-supplier constraint often led to diversifying (product extension and conglomerate) acquisitions in the 1960s. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) maintain that corporations pursue diversifying acquisitions when horizontal and vertical combinations are prohibited. Antitrust law and enforcement policies discouraged horizontal and vertical acquisitions in this period (Fligstein 1990 ).2
Ownership Relations
The top managers and directors of large corporations are also embedded in social relations that may shape their interests and capacities with respect to corporate behavior. Foremost among these are the property relations that define a firm's mode of control. Managerialist and power-structure theory analyze the embeddedness implications of these relations.
One dimension of a corporation's mode of control concerns the extent to which top managers and inside directors (directors who are officers or otherwise principally affiliated with the firm) are salaried professionals rather than major stockholders. Managerialist and power-structure theorists offer different but complementary interpretations of this dimension. Managerialists believe that the percentage of firms controlled by salaried professional managers has increased over the course of this century and that professional managers behave according to different incentives than their capitalist, owner-manager, predecessors. Salaried professionals are thought to place a higher value on stable growth and a lower value on profit maximization than do owner-managers. Their compensation comes predominantly in wages, which are correlated with firm size, while compensation for owner-managers comes largely in stock dividends and stock price appreciation, which are tied to a firm's market value (Dahrendorf 1959; Galbraith 2 Only 23 percent of the acquired firms with $10 million or more in assets between 1963 and 1968 represented horizontal or vertical acquisitions. The vast majority were diversifying acquisitions: 58 percent were geographic or productmarket extensions, and 19 percent were forays into completely unrelated product lines (Weston, Chung, and Hoag 1990:13). Among the acquisitions studied here, 46 percent represented geographic or product-market extensions, and 43 percent represented forays into unrelated product areas. Unfortunately, the relatively small number of events observed in our study prohibits an examination of friendly and predatory acquisitions by industrial type. THE OTHER CONTESTED TERRAIN 473 1971).3 In addition, managerialists might presume that professional managers place less value than do owner-managers on retaining unilateral control of the firms they command. Their status as employees may lead to an instrumental attachment to the firm, while the proprietor status of owner-managers may lead to an affective attachment. If so, ownermanagers may have been less receptive than were salaried professionals to the friendly acquisition overtures of other firms in the 1960s. Friendly acquisitions often cause the top managers of acquired firms to surrender some decision-making discretion, but leave them positioned in longer chains of mobility with new chances for bureaucratic advancement and salary enhancement. The loss of decision-making discretion would presumably be more disturbing and the salary gains less enticing to owner-managers than they would be to professional managers.
Power structure theorists dispute managerialist claims regarding the growing presence and divergent motivations of salaried professionals in corporate top management. They focus on the constellation of political forces that underpin corporate elites' incumbency (Zeitlin 1974) . From this vantage point, the absence of stock in the hands of a firm's managers and inside directors makes it easier for predators to acquire a firm against the wishes of its managers and directors. This implies that firms run by owner-managers would be less vulnerable to predatory acquisition than those run by professional managers in the 1960s.
A second dimension of a firm's mode of control concerns the extent to which its managers are relatively autonomous from outside interests represented on the board. The autonomy of top managers is greatest when inside directors predominate on a firm's board. Power structure theory and managerialist theory offer conflicting interpretations of this dimension. Power structure theorists assume that corporate boards are both sites in which contests for corporate control are waged and, when dominated by management, shields against predator initiatives. Boards have the legal power to authorize vigorous defensive measures when a corporation becomes the target of an unwanted acquisition bid. In the 1960s, defensive measures were primarily employed after a firm became a target (Davis 1993) . Targeted corporations engaged in advertising campaigns to maintain stockholder loyalty, withheld information on stockholder identities from predators, and filed lawsuits to block stock acquisition by bidders. Corporations whose boards were dominated by insiders may have been more likely to approve defensive measures because their board members stood to benefit from their firms' survival. Thus, corporations whose boards of directors were dominated by insiders in the 1960s may have been less vulnerable to predatory acquisition because of their access to defenses against a takeover.
Managerialists maintain, though, that top managers only appoint confederate outsiders to their boards, regardless of whether top managers are principal owners or merely employees of their firms (Berle and Means 1968; Mace 1971). Owner-managers can exercise the voting rights associated with their stock ownership to engineer the election of allies to their boards. Professional managers can accomplish the same by virtue of their control of the proxy machinery. It is difficult for dispersed stockholders to scrutinize candidates for the board, so they typically sign over their votes on such matters to management. Hence, the willingness of board members to protect management from unwanted predators should be unrelated to whether board members are insiders or outsiders, since both are aligned with top management. This implies that the composition of a firm's board of directors in the 1960s should have no effect on its chances of being acquired by a predator.
Business Elite Networks
The directors of large corporations are also embedded in social networks comprised of ties among business elites that arise from membership in multiple corporate boards. These ties define a director's centrality in the business elite and cause corporations to be interlocked with one another. The most central directors are those who sit on the boards 474 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW (but are not necessarily officers) of commercial banks. Such "finance capitalists" sit on the greatest number of corporate boards, of the largest firms, situated in core industries (Soref 1980) . They are also more frequently than are other directors drawn from propertied families-families owning substantial blocks of stock in large firms-and are members of the "establishment,"as indicated by listings in the Social Register, social club memberships, and preparatory school attendance (Soref and Zeitlin 1987) . Power structure researchers have studied director centrality and interlocking directorates extensively. They assume that the most central business elites possess more information and power than do other elites, and they use this information and power in the interests of the elite as a whole (Domhoff 1967 (Domhoff , 1986 (Domhoff , 1990 Zeitlin 1974; Useem 1979 Useem , 1983 . They also believe that the business elite uses interlocking directorates to foster a sense of cohesion and a shared world view-more specifically, to promulgate norms of appropriate business practice and to control deviant business behavior (Domhoff 1970; Koenig and Gogel 1981) . The business elite is not, however, monolithic.
First, competition exists between the leaders of different firms. Friendly acquisitions can be considered the outcome of two contests: one between suitors for attractive and willing partners, and the other between willing partners for desirable suitors. Sometimes intermediaries play a role in matching suitors to partners. Investment banks have an interest in brokering acquisitions because they garner fees for doing so. Some claim that commercial banks also broker acquisitions between client firms to obtain financial service contracts and to maximize the value of their stock and loan portfolios (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1970; Kotz 1979) . From a strictly economic standpoint, every top management team and board of directors has a price above which it would be willing to sell its assets. Firms overseen by central directors in the 1960s, especially finance capitalist directors, should have been more successful in the contest to attract the attention of desirable suitors because they were plugged into social networks through which information coursed about attractive and willing partners and desirable suitors. Firms whose directors sat on the boards of investment banks and commercial banks should also have been particularly successful in this contest because they were linked to intermediaries who had an interest in their acquisition.
The business elite is also fragmented by internal conflicts regarding the appropriateness of particular business practices. Predatory acquisitions in the 1960s, individually and collectively, were the object of intraelite conflict. Individually, they involved conflicts between impertinent corporate suitors and unwilling targets. As a group, they contradicted norms about the way in which corporate control should be transferred in the economy, a challenge to the reigning structure of power in American business and possibly a threat to the integrity of the U.S. economy. Predatory acquisitions had not been attempted in significant numbers until the mid-1960s (Jarrell and Bradley 1980). Predators were led by people who were geographically, religiously, or socially peripheral to the business elite-the earliest practitioners being disproportionately from the South, Jewish, and leaders of relatively small, young firms (Hirsch 1986 ). Targets, on the other hand, were large and established relative to their predators (Steiner 1975 
AGENCY THEORY AND CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
The most frequently cited economic motivation for acquisitions was first formulated by Manne (1965) in connection with the 1960s wave of mergers-the disciplining of "inefficient" managers. When outsiders acquire firms run by "inefficient" managers and discipline these managers (through increased monitoring or replacement), they realize profits as markets elevate the valuation of the acquired firm's stock to reflect this improvement. Managerial inefficiency can be the result of incompetence (poor decision-making Austin and Fishman (1970) maintain that opposition to predatory acquisitions emanated from "direct and overt legislative lobbying on behalf of American industry, especially from those potentially vulnerable to attack" (p. 34). Indeed, the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce both testified on behalf of the Williams Act. The editor and publisher of Mergers and Acquisitions: The Journal of Corporate Ventures was more sweeping in his evaluation, asserting that the "corporate establishment" was behind the opposition to predatory acquisitions (U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency 1967). The deviant status of predatory combinations at the time is reflected in the language used by participants and the press to describe them. Suitors were referred to as "raiders," targets as "damsels in distress," and firms that acquired the targets of predators in friendly combinations were termed "saviors" and "white knights" (Hirsch 1986 (Malkiel 1975 ). Despite its popularity among observers, no one has yet found empirical support for this "P/E game" hypothesis (Palepu 1986 ). Second, Gort (1969) hypothesized that acquisitions tend to cluster over time in industries that experience "disturbances" that alter the value of assets, and thus the financial gains to acquisition, in an industry. Economic disturbances can be caused by changes in an industry's technology, structure, or regulatory environment. Surprisingly, no one has observed support for this "industry-disturbance" hypothesis either (Palepu 1986 ).
Finally, large firm size has been considered a barrier to a firm's acquisition. Most researchers attribute this to the greater volume of capital that must be raised to acquire large firms. However, large size may also be indicative of the economic, social, and political power of potential targets and thus their ability to fend off unwelcome overtures. Research has consistently found a negative relation between size of a firm and the likelihood of its acquisition over a wide range of historical periods ( , and a variety of other sources, we identified 71 firms that were acquired.7 Case studies were constructed for each acquisition to determine the exact day acquired firms first became the 6 Some agency theorists also maintain that excess free cash flow (cash flow above that needed to finance profitable investment opportunities) provides managers with an incentive for opportunistic behavior and thus elevates the likelihood of acquisition. They also argue that indebtedness leads financial institutions to monitor managerial performance, which reduces opportunism and thus depresses the likelihood of acquisition (Jensen 1986 ). We investigated the effects of excess free cash flow and indebtedness, as well as a variety of other economic factors (insufficient cash flow, leverage, growth in sales, and number of previous acquisitions in the presence of excess free cash flow) on the likelihood of acquisition. None was significant in our period. Alternate measures of performance (equal-weighted market-adjusted stock returns) and firm value (market-value to book-value ratio) produced results identical to those generated by their analogs. Results for these auxiliary analyses are available from the first author on request.
7 Another 1 3 corporations that disappeared as the result of combinations with other firms during our period were not coded as acquired. Six were long-standing subsidiaries of the acquiring firm prior to the date of acquisition, and seven merged with another corporation as an equal. These firms contribute data to our analysis up until the day the combinations in question were initiated. object of an acquirer's interest (even if the initial bidder was not the corporation that eventually purchased the acquired firm) and to distinguish friendly from predatory acquisitions. Case histories were based on articles in The Wall Street Journal. A corporation was coded as being acquired in a predatory fashion if (1) the first firm to express an interest in it began by purchasing its stock on the open market or by making a public tender offer for its stock (as long as there was no indication that the target firm's management solicited or aided the bid), or (2) at any point leading up to the corporation's acquisition it became the object of a suitor's stock purchases or tender offer that it actively tried to rebuff. Thirtyseven of our 71 acquisitions were predatory by this definition.8
We conducted a competing-risks continuous-time event-history analysis of the rate at which corporations became partners in a friendly acquisition or victims of a predatory takeover in our study period. The dates of acquisition for firms that were acquired and the last dates for which we had independent measures for firms that were not acquired (in almost all cases the date was December 31, 1968) were used to estimate instantaneous transition rates to friendly or predatory acquisition for each firm in our data set. These transition rates were modeled as a function of our independent variables and of time (Tuma and Hannan 1984) . Independent variables were updated as soon as new information on them became available. This required dividing each firm's event history for the study period into shorter "spells." Data on a firm's independent variables as of January 1, 1963 were used to predict its acquisition rate until new data on any of its variables became available, at which time its first spell was considered to end and its second spell was considered to begin. The updated variables, along with any unchanged variables, were then used to predict the firm's acquisition rate in the second spell. Each time new information on one of a firm's variables became available, the current spell ended and a new one began. Our 478 firms contributed 33,781 spells (about 71 spells each) to the analysis. A more detailed description of the construction of the spells is available from the first author on request.9
As is customary in event-history analyses, we assume that the acquisition rates in our study period were an exponential function of 8 Our method of distinguishing between predatory and friendly acquisitions closely conforms to that used in prior studies. For example, Shivdasani (1993) defined an acquisition attempt as hostile, "[i]f the initial bid was rejected or not acknowledged by the board" (p. 172). Morck et al. (1988a) define an acquisition as hostile, "[i]f it was not negotiated prior to the initial bid, was not accepted from the start, or was contested by the target management in any way" (p. 106). Nevertheless, our procedure may lead to coding errors-in particular, when acquisitions that begin with stock purchases on the open market or a public tender offer are followed by silence on the part of the target firm's management. We suspect that most of these acquisitions are "bear hugs," in which a target firm's managers become the reluctant object of a predator's interest, but capitulate without visible signs of a struggle to avoid the costs of a futile takeover battle and/or to salvage personal gain by negotiating lucrative severance packages (Aranow and Einhorn 1973; Brill 1976 ). Thus, we coded them as "predatory." However, some may be friendly combinations in which the target firm's managers solicited, or even aided, a suitor's overture, but for legal reasons disguised their role in the acquisition. Experimentation with alternative coding rules suggests that such errors, if they contaminate our data, would not substantially alter our results. 9 This method of updating independent variables reduces the need to make arbitrary assumptions about the lag structure of the effects of covariates on acquisition rates-of particular importance for variables like the number of previous acquisitions in a firm's industry that not only change in continuous time but are observed to do so by the actors under investigation. The method has the obvious disadvantage, however, of increasing the chance that errors in predicting acquisition rates are correlated across spells within firms. We limit autocorrelation bias by specifying our models as thoroughly as possible. To this end, we explored the effects of additional variables that might be expected to (but did not) affect acquisition rates: age of firm, growth rate, industrial diversity, structure, and acquisitiveness, as well as the educational attainment (coded as MBA/non-MBA, and elite/nonelite), functional background (coded as finance/nonfinance) and social background (coded based on listing in the Social Register and social club memberships) of the Chief Executive Officer. Results for these auxiliary analyses are available from the lead author on request.
covariates. Conventional wisdom and, to a lesser extent, examination of the integrated hazard function for acquisition led us also to assume that rates increased exponentially with time over the study period. Acquisitions are widely believed to come in waves-one of which occurred in the 1960s (Weston, Chung, and Hoag 1990). It is unclear exactly when the 1960s wave began. However, the pace of acquisitions appeared to increase dramatically between 1964 and 1966, reaching a peak in 1968 (U.S. Federal Trade Commission 1981, table 15). Hence, we think our study's time frame captures the acceleration phase of this wave.10 The empirical hazard function for all acquisitions roughly confirms this assessment, with rates accelerating beginning in 1966."1 Thus, our models of friendly and predatory acquisition rates can be represented as:
where r(t) is the instantaneous transition rate to acquisition, t represents time since the beginning of the study period, X is a matrix of independent variables, B is a vector of coefficients indicating effects of the variables in X, and C indicates the rate at which acquisition rates increased over the study period. The date on which a firm became the object of a friendly acquisition is considered the date on which its record is censored for the purposes of the predatory acquisition analysis and vice versa.
In event-history models, the magnitude of a covariate's effect is typically represented as the amount by which transition rates are multiplied given a one-unit change in the covariate (Tuma and Hannan 1984:159-60). It is difficult to compare such representations across covariates, though, because variables typically exhibit different univariate distributions. To facilitate the comparison of covariate effects in our study, we plotted each covariate's effect as the ratio of the transition rate to acquisition at regular intervals in its distribution, relative to the transition rate at its median value. Consider the transition rate for a particular firm: 11 Some researchers caution against the use of models that characterize time dependence in a fully parametric way because such models seldom fit data well (Yamaguchi 1991) . To determine whether possible misspecification of time dependence in our models distorted estimates of the parameter effects of interest, we also computed analogous partial-likelihood Cox models that characterize time dependence nonparametrically. The estimated parameter effects and tests of statistical significance in these Cox models were essentially identical to those of the maximum-likelihood Gompertz models discussed in the text. THE OTHER CONTESTED TERRAIN 479 bution and the resulting ratio is 2, moving from the median value of the variable's distribution to the 95th percentile would double firm i's acquisition rate.
We investigate many potential determinants of the likelihood of acquisition relative to the number of events studied. This raises the possibility that significant covariate effects are actually manifestations of random interactions among groups of insignificant independent variables. To minimize this possibility, we begin by estimating models that include the effects of all the social embeddedness and economic variables. Then we present more parsimonious models that include only those effects that exceeded or approached statistical significance at thep < .05 level in the full models. None of the effects that was statistically significant at the p < .05 level in one of the full models failed to clear the p < .05 hurdle in the corresponding parsimonious model. All of the effects that approached statistical significance in one of the full models cleared the p < .05 hurdle in the corresponding parsimonious model. We consider the latter effects suggestive of empirical associations. Investigation of a large number of alternative model specifications indicate that no variable excluded from the parsimonious models significantly affected the likelihood of acquisition in question.12
DATA AND MEASURES
We identify three dimensions of a potential target's position in the resource-dependence network: the extent to which it (1) was structurally autonomous (free from resource dependence vis-a'-vis potential transaction partners), (2) constrained firms in other sectors, and (3) was free from competitive uncertainty. The variables that capture a corporation's position along these three dimensions are based on the concentration level and transaction pattern of the primary input/output industry in which it produced in 1963.13 12 There are two other potential methodological problems. First, because our analyses only cover the period between 1963 and 1968, data prior to 1963 are censored and truncated. Our data are fully left-censored insofar as we know nothing about the event histories of firms acquired before 1963 (Yamaguchi 1991:7). This problem is mitigated to the extent that acquisitions cluster over time and our study period encompasses the heart of the 1960s wave. Our substantive focus is on acquisitions in the 1960s and we do not wish to generalize about acquisitions in earlier or later periods. More problematic, our data are left-truncated insofar as we are missing pre-1963 information on firms that survived to be included in our study (Yamaguchi 1991:7) . This problem is mitigated to the extent that an additional condition holds-the onset of an acquisition wave marks the beginning of a temporally local acquisition process. Indeed, some scholars think that the beginning and end of acquisition waves coincide with changes in macroeconomic and social structural conditions, and that the effects of the determinants of the likelihood of acquisition vary with the presence of these conditions (Stearns and Allan 1993; Zey 1994). For example, it is believed that acquisition rates increase when economy-wide interest rates decline, and thus managerial inefficiency leads firms to be acquired only when such rates are low. Second, it is possible that by disaggregating our relatively small number of acquisition events into friendly and predatory subgroups we reduce the chance of observing statistically significant effects for covariates that influence friendly and predatory acquisitions in the same manner and to the same extent. To determine if this is the case, we estimated a model predicting the probability of acquisition regardless of tenor. All covariates that were statistically significant in this aggregated model were also significant in one of the two comparable disaggregated full models presented in Table 2 Our measures of corporate resource dependence are subject to error for these firms because they fail to take into account the competitive uncertainty, constraint on other sectors, and structural autonomy associated with the secondary industries in which the firms produced. Such errors, insofar as they introduce "noise" into our measures of resource dependence, probably make it more difficult to observe support for the resource dependence hypotheses. Further, if related to unob-
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The extent to which an industry was structurally autonomous was measured directly by scores calculated by Burt (1986:18) . These structural autonomy scores indicate the extent to which producing in a relatively concentrated industry that transacts with relatively many other sectors, which themselves are relatively unconcentrated, allows for above-average profits. Burt (1986) calculated these scores using regression coefficients that measure the impact of interindustry constraint on industry profit margins.
The extent to which an industry constrained firms in other sectors was measured using "raw constraint" scores from Burt (1986:16-17). Each constraint score (C11), which varies from 0 to 1, indicates the extent to which industry i is resource dependent on another sector j . More formally,
where, pi1 is the proportion of market i transactions with suppliers and consumers that directly or indirectly involve market j, and O0 is the concentration ratio (as defined below) in market j. Cij is large to the extent that industry i transacts primarily with industry j and industry j is highly concentrated. We summed over i the 76 Ci1 scores associated with an input/output sector j to measure the extent to which sector constrained other industries in the economy in general.
Finally, the extent to which an industry was free from competitive uncertainty was measured using concentration scores from Burt (1986:15-16 ). An input/output sector's concentration score is an average of the four-. firm concentration ratios for the four-digit SIC industries composing its sector, weighted by the volume of sales in the constituent SIC industries. We calculated the absolute value of the difference between an input/output sector's concentration score and the mean concentration score for all manufacturing sectors (.3901) to measure the extent to which an industry was relatively competitive or oligopolized. A low value indicates a high degree of competitive uncertainty. These three measures of resource dependence should be representative of the entire period we study, insofar as Burt (1988) has shown that they or related measures were remarkably stable between 1963 and 1977.
Data on stock ownership were obtained primarily from Burch (1972) . 1985) . Inside directors create "sent interlocks" from a focal corporation to the other firms on whose boards they sit. Outside directors create "received interlocks" from their firm of principal affiliation to the focal corporation, and they create "neutral interlocks" between the focal corporation and the other firms on whose boards they sit.
Corporate-network theorists debate the relative significance of "sent" and "received" interlocks as compared to "neutral" interlocks. Sent and received interlocks are sometimes referred to as "strong ties," indicating that the persons who create them are principally affiliated with one of the connected firms. Neutral interlocks are referred to as "weak ties," indicating that the persons who create them are typically affiliated with a third organization that maintains "strong ties" to the connected firms (Mizruchi 1982; Mintz and Schwartz 1985) . Most network researchers believe that strong ties are more likely to facilitate exchanges of influence and information between actors because the relationships they facilitate are more intense. Hence most interlock researchers believe that sent and received interlocks facilitate intercorporate exchange of influence and information more frequently than do neutral interlocks because the persons who create them are more willing and able to serve as representatives of the firms they connect ( However, Granovetter (1973 Granovetter ( , 1974 argues that weak ties are better than strong ties at providing actors with information, partly because they tap sources not already available to them. One study provides evidence that neutral interlocks are more likely than sent and received interlocks to link firms previously unconnected by other relations, such as interfirm stockholding, long-term contracts, and common headquarters location (Palmer et al. 1986 ). Another study found that neutral interlocks with multidivisional firms influenced adoption of a multidivisional structure, while sent and received interlocks in combination did not (Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou 1993). Neutral interlocks with commercial banks may be particularly consequential for corporate behavior. By definition, interlocks with commercial banks are created by "finance capitalists," and finance capitalists are believed to represent the interests of the business elite as a whole rather than the interests of specific firms (Zeitlin 1974; Soref and Zeitlin 1987 ). Thus, they need not be principally affiliated with one of the firms they connect to have an interest and capacity to influence the firms on whose boards they sit (Palmer 1983 ).
The relative significance of sent as compared to received interlocks is less well theorized, but probably depends on two factors: the relationship facilitated by an interlock, and the interlock partner most interested in sustaining that relationship. Some researchers view interlocks as devices through which receiving firms "co-opt" senders (Allen 1974; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Others view interlocks as devices by which sending firms "infiltrate" receiving firms (Mizruchi and Bunting 1981; Mintz and Schwartz 1985) . If interlocks are co-optive devices and our sampled firms are the interested partners, as is the case when firms seek attractive suitors or try to rebuff predators, then received interlocks should be more consequential. However, if interlocks are co-optive devices but other firms are the interested partners, as would be the case if other firms like financial institutions seek to arrange corporate marriages for their own benefit, then sent interlocks should be more consequential. Alternatively, if interlocks are infiltrative devices and our sampled firms are the interested partners, then sent interlocks should be more consequential. However, if interlocks are infiltrative devices and other firms are the interested partners, then received interlocks should be more consequential.
We suspect that the relative importance of strong versus weak ties and sent versus received interlocks varies depending on the corporate concern in question-the identification of attractive suitors, the mobilization of support to rebuff predators, the selection of appropriate organizational structures, and so on. While we offer no specific hypotheses, we keep separate counts of the number of sent, received, and neutral interlocks our firms maintained with other industrial corporations and commercial banks to detect possible variation in the effects of different types of interlocks on the likelihood of acquisition. The vast majority of investment banks were organized as partnerships in the 1960s. Hence, industrial corporations could only appoint investment bank partners to their boards (from the perspective of industrial corporations, creating received investment bank interlocks). However, one major investment bank, Lehman Brothers, reorganized into the corporate form in our period and began accepting directors from industrial corporations (from the perspective of the industrial corporations, creating sent investment bank interlocks). To preserve full information on interlocks to Lehman Brothers, we summed the number of received and sent interlocks to investment banks into a single measure of directional interlocks to these institutions. Because very few investment bank partners sat on more than one corporate board in the 1960s, we observed very few neutral interlocks with investment houses in our data and ignored these connections in our analyses.'4 Data on corporate return on equity, q-ratio, price/earnings ratio, and size were updated annually at the end of a firm's fiscal year. Information was obtained primarily from the Industrial Compustat annual data file and the Center for Research in Stock Prices data file. When necessary, Moody's Industrial Manual was used to fill in missing accounting data, and The Wall Street Journal was used to fill in missing stock price data.'5 The number of firms "recently" acquired in a corporation's primary two-digit SIC industry was updated on a daily basis. Only target firms with more than $10 million in assets, purchased by 1962 Top 500 corporations, and acquired in the previous 365 days were counted. The number of firms acquired in a corporation's primary industry over the previous year is positively correlated with the number of acquisitions in the industry in prior years of the study period (r = .72). Further, the number of firms acquired in an industry in prior years may indicate the exhaustion of viable acquisition targets in the industry and thus be negatively related to the probability that a firm producing in an industry would be acquired. Failure to take into account the impact of the exhaustion of viable target firms could obscure the effect of recent acquisitions in an industry. Thus, we also kept daily counts of the number of acquisitions made in a corporation's primary industry since the beginning of the study period but not in the immediately preceding year (denoted "prior acquisitions"), and we used this variable as a control.'6 Table 1 lists each of the 20 vari-14 Analyses that counted sent investment bank interlocks separately and included counts of neutral investment bank interlocks were entirely consistent with our presumptions. The effect of sent investment bank interlocks (really, sent interlocks to Lehman Brothers) on the likelihood of acquisition mirrored that of received investment-bank interlocks; neutral bank interlocks had no effect on acquisition rates. 15 The accounting variables were operationalized as follows using items from the COMPU-STAT file (item numbers in parentheses). Return on equity was defined as the ratio of net income before extraordinary items and discontinued oprations (item 18) to the value of common (item 11) and preferred equity (item 10). The q-ratio was measured as suggested by Amit, Livnat, and Zarowin (1989). The numerator was the sum of the market value of common equity (item 24 x item 25), the book value of long-term debt (item 9), debt due within one year (item 34), and the liquidating value of preferred stock (item 10). The denominator was the book value of total assets (item 6). Size of firm was measured as the market value of common equity (item 24 x item 25). Analyses that used alternative measures of size (logged market value of equity and logged total assets) were essentially identical to those reported here. The price/earnings ratio was measured as the ratio of the price per share of common stock (item 24) to primary earnings per share before extraordinary items (item 58). Since a negative price/earnings ratio is nonsensical, we assigned negative price/earnings ratios a value of 55.36. This value corresponds to the 99th percentile of observed price/earnings ratios. We observed 55 (out of 2,875) negative price/earnings ratios.
16The identity of firms with more than $10 million in assets that were acquired sometime during our study period by firms among the largest 500 U.S. industrial corporations in 1962, as well as the primary industries in which the acquiring and acquired firms produced, were reported in the Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions ables employed in our analyses, their descriptive statistics (based on spells), and their predicted effects on a firm's likelihood of friendly or predatory acquisition.
RESULTS
Resource Dependence Relations
As expected, the extent to which other sectors were constrained by a corporation's primary industry increased its chance of predatory takeover, but decreased its chance of friendly acquisition in the 1960s (Table 2) . This suggests that possessing the resourcedependence-based capacity to constrain firms in other industries gave corporations little incentive to seek or welcome friendly acquisition partners, but made them the target of predators-most likely from other nonlinked industries, considering the antitrust climate of the period. The effects of producing in an industry that constrained other firms, though, were among the smallest observed in this study. Corporations whose constraint on other firms fell in the 95th percentile of firms in our sample were only 1.76 times more likely to become victims of predatory takeovers and 2.4 times less likely to become partners in friendly acquisitions than were corporations whose constraint on other firms fell in the 5th percentile (Table 3) . (Table 2 ). The effect was modest relative to other effects observed here-the ratio of friendly acquisition rates for firms in the 5th percentile to those in the 95th percentile with respect to their primary industry's mean-deviated concentration was 4.95 (Table 3) . However, freedom from competitive uncertainty did not significantly affect the probability of a predatory takeover. This suggests that a firm's desire to reduce competitive uncertainty in industries where concentration levels approached the economy-wide average led them to seek friendly combinations with other corporations-again, most likely in other nonlinked industries, considering the regulatory environment of the period.
Also as expected, freedom from competitive uncertainty (as measured by the meandeviated concentration of a corporation's primary industry) reduced a firm's chance of friendly acquisition in the 1960s
The results with respect to a corporation's structural autonomy, departed from our predictions. Freedom from dependence on transaction partners did not affect a firm's chance of a predatory takeover in the 1960s, and increased rather than decreased its probability of friendly acquisition (Table 2 ). This unexpected influence of structural autonomy was the largest of the resource-dependence effects-the ratio of friendly acquisition rates for firms in the 95th percentile as opposed to the 5th percentile with respect to autonomy was 10.4 (Table 3) . We expected autonomous corporations to have little incentive to be absorbed by another firm. Perhaps corporations in structurally autonomous industries that sought to be acquired for other reasons were well-positioned to attract desirable suitorsespecially suitors producing in other nonlinked industries. Diversifying moves are most effective at reducing interindustry dependence when the acquired firm occupies a relatively autonomous market position. If firms producing in structurally autonomous industries are attractive to suitors, it is not solely because they are more profitable-the structural autonomy effect obtains even controlling for firm profitability (return on equity). Presumably autonomy provides firms with the freedom to pursue other interests that have a less immediate connection to profits-such as strategic, technological, or structural innovation. Still, if structural autonomy made firms attractive targets, we would have expected predatory acquisitions to follow the same pattern. They did not.
Ownership Relations
As expected, stock ownership concentrated in the hands of persons represented both on the board and in top management (inside directors) reduced a corporation's chance of being acquired in either a friendly or predatory manner in the 1960s. However, stock ownership concentrated in the hands of groups that lacked control of day-to-day decision-making, either because they were represented only on the board or because they were not represented on the board or in top management, had no effect on the probability of either type of acquisition ( Table 2 ). The effects for insider stock ownership were the third and fourth largest observed in our study-corporations whose stock ownership by insiders fell in the 95th percentile of firms in our sample were 15.26 times less likely to become friendly acquisition partners and 15.28 times less likely to become victims of a predatory takeover than were those whose insider stock ownership fell in the 5th percentile (Table 3) . These observed effects do not establish the relative validities of the different but compatible managerialist, powerstructure, and agency theory accounts of the likelihood of acquisition. These effects may reflect the reluctance of manager-owners to The proportion of inside directors on a firm's board decreased its chance of a predatory takeover, but as expected, had no effect on its probability of a friendly acquisition in the 1960s (Table 2 ). The effect of board composition on the likelihood of a predatory acquisition was more modest than the insider ownership effect-the ratio of predatory acquisition rates for firms in the 95th as opposed to the 5th percentile with respect to their proportion of inside directors was 4.91 (Table 3 ). This result adjudicates the competing managerialist, power-structure, and agency theory claims regarding the effect of board composition on the likelihood of acquisition. The result is inconsistent with the managerialist assumption that boards of directors universally rubber stamp decisions by top management and ownership groups, whether staffed by insiders or outsiders. It is also at odds with the agency theory postulate that insider-dominated boards provide poor monitoring and control of opportunism among top managers and thus increase the potential payoff to acquirers.17 Instead, the result is aligned with the power-structure view that boards of directors represent a line of defense against outside threats to management's or an ownership group's control of a firm. Boards dominated by a firm's top managers or owners may have been better able to mount credible defenses against a takeover, thus deterring acquisition-minded firms from pursuing them. It is unlikely, however, that insider-dominated boards helped corporations escape acquisition after they became the targets of bold and persistent predators. Inspection of a list of all hostile tender offers in the 1960s (Binder 1973 , appendix 1) indicated that only three of the firms in our sample experienced a significant predatory bid in the 1960s and avoided either hostile takeover or acquisition by a "white knight" (a firm into which a target willingly merges in order to escape a predator's embrace).
Business-Elite Connections
The centrality of a corporation's directors in the business elite network also affected its chance of being acquired in the 1960s, although the effects of interlocking were more pervasive with respect to friendly acquisitions as compared to predatory acquisitions. Three of the seven types of interlocks increased a firm's chance of friendly acquisition as expected ( Table 2 ). The effects of received industrial interlocks and directional investment bank interlocks were relatively small. Corporations whose number of received industrial interlocks fell in the 95th percentile were 1.99 times more likely to become friendly acquisition partners than those whose received industrial interlocks fell in the 5th percentile. Corporations whose number of directional investment bank interlocks fell in the 95th percentile were 2.35 times more likely to become friendly acquisition partners than those whose investment bank interlocks fell in the 5th percentile."8 The ef-17 Shivdasani (1993) also found that firms with outsider-dominated boards were no less likely to become hostile targets, although the likelihood of acquisition decreased when outsiders held large equity positions. Nevertheless, some might argue that our result is consistent with a more complicated agency theory explanation. It has been hypothesized, and to some extent shown, that firms with insider-dominated boards are more likely to adopt proactive antitakeover provisions, such as green-mail, golden parachutes, classified boards, and poison pills in the 1980s (Kosnick 1987; Davis 1991 Davis , 1993 . This tendency has been characterized as an expression of the agency problems experienced by firms with dispersed stock ownership. Such an explanation has two deficiencies. First, empirically, these more sophisticated proactive takeover defenses were not common in our period (Davis 1993 ). Second, from a theoretical standpoint, this more complicated agency theory explanation represents a major concession to the power-structure view insofar as it permits inefficient principal-agent arrangements to persist in equilibrium.
18 This relatively weak effect of investment bank interlocks is broadly consistent with Baker's (1990) results. He found that while interlocks fect of interlocks from commercial banks was more substantial-the ratio of the friendly acquisition rate for corporations in the 95th as opposed to the 5th percentile with respect to received commercial bank interlocks was 6.94 (Table 3) Received industrial interlocks, received commercial bank interlocks, and directional investment bank interlocks may have increased the probability of friendly acquisition in the 1960s because they allowed corporations to "co-opt" other firms in their environments-enlisting their support in finding attractive suitors and advertising their availability and suitability as acquisition partners. Received interlocks may have proven more wieldy than sent interlocks as tools with which corporations could elicit the support of others because suitor-seeking firms have greater control over the appointment of outsiders to their boards than they have over the placement of their representatives on other boards. Further, information attesting to a firm's desirability as an acquisition partner may be viewed as biased when conveyed through sent interlocks insofar as the messengers in such ties are principally affiliated with the hopeful acquisition partner. Alternatively, received interlocks may have allowed commercial and investment bank representatives to "infiltrate" the boards of prospective acquisition partners-encouraging them to seek, or at least welcome, acquisition, which could be financially rewarding to the bank if it obtained fees for negotiating the combination or held stock in the target firm. Of course, the prospect of financial gain for banks, as well as the status and economic benefits for individual directors, may have provided incentives for bank directors to join a firm's board and aid it in its quest for an attractive suitor.
Regardless, it appears that industrial interlocks did not often facilitate friendly acquisitions by disseminating information directly between targets and suitors. Only three of the firms acquired in friendly combinations shared a director with their acquirer in the years prior to their union. Nor does it appear that commercial banks or investment banks often steered firms on whose boards they were represented toward suitors with which they were also interlocked. Only one of the firms acquired in a friendly combination was previously indirectly interlocked through a commercial bank or an investment bank with its eventual acquirer. Desirable acquirers and attractive suitors probably became known to one another by sharing directors with firms that were in turn directly or indirectly interlocked with one another. This characterization of the mechanism through which interlocks facilitated friendly acquisition in the 1960s dovetails with views that downplay the dyadic as opposed to the diffuse network significance of interlocking directorates (Palmer 1983; Schwartz 1981, 1985; Baker 1990 ). It also fits Useem's (1983) view that interlocks help firm's scan the larger business environment and is consistent with Hirsch's (1982) observation that directors eschew interlock relationships that suggest conflicts of interest.20 with investment banks were related to the overall configuration of a corporation's market relations with investment houses (e.g., the number of banks with which it contracted), such interlocks did not determine which investment banks a corporation did business with.
19 This stronger effect for received commercial bank interlocks is consistent with Fligstein and Markowitz's (1992) results, which show that the percentage of bank officers on a firm' s board was one of only two variables to predict the likelihood of acquisition (friendly or predatory) in the 1980s. 20 Our results may merely reflect the tendency of firms to appoint bankers to their boards after Only the number of neutral interlocks with commercial banks affected a corporation's chance of being acquired by a predator in the 1960s. As expected, the more neutral bank interlocks a corporation maintained, the less likely it was to be acquired in a predatory manner ( Table 2 ). The effect of neutral commercial bank interlocks was modest in magnitude-the ratio of the predatory acquisition rate for firms in the 95th percentile as opposed to the 5th percentile with respect to neutral commercial bank interlocks was 6.01 (Table 3 ). This suggests that this type of interlock may have provided corporations some protection from predators in our period. We expected that bank interlocks would be particularly likely to inhibit predatory acquisition insofar as they are created by finance capitalists-the most central members of the business elite who viewed predatory acquisitions with disdain. However, it is somewhat surprising that neutral rather than sent or received interlocks produced this inhibiting effect insofar as strong ties appeared more consequential for friendly acquisitions. Perhaps neutral interlocks are more consequential in connection with predatory takeovers because they are created by finance capitalists who are not themselves representatives of either the potential target or a possibly self-interested bank. Thus, they are free to act as agents of the business elite as a whole on this issue that concerns its classwide interests (Palmer 1983) .
Finally, contrary to prediction, the number of neutral interlocks to industrial corporations may have reduced a firm's chance of friendly acquisition in the 1960s. The effect of neutral industrial interlocks approached statistical significance at the p < .05 level in the full model and cleared this hurdle in the parsimonious model. We hesitate to interpret this unexpected result because of its borderline statistical significance.
Other Economic Factors
Here we present results pertaining to the other agency theory and more traditional economic accounts of the likelihood of acquisition. The undervaluation of a corporation's assets-indicated by a low q-ratio-increased its chance of predatory acquisition in the 1960s. Undervaluation did not, however, increase the probability of friendly acquisition ( Table 2 ). The magnitude of the q-ratio effect on the likelihood of a predatory acquisition was by far the largest observed in the study-corporations whose q-ratios fell in the 5th percentile of firms in our sample were 3,631 times more likely to become victims of a predatory takeover than were those with q-ratios in the 95th percentile (Table 3 ). This huge difference can be attributed largely to the fact that firms with the highest q-ratios were virtually immune from predatory acquisition-firms with the lowest q-ratios were just four times more likely than the median firm to be taken over. This pattern of results is consistent with past research (Morck et al. 1988a ; Davis and Stout 1992), suggesting that the gains to be reaped from eradicating managerial inefficiency motivated predatory (but not friendly) acquisitions in the 1960s. Of course, we have they have decided to seek acquisition partners in order to obtain advice regarding the relative merits of prospective deals. However, we find this explanation less convincing than the others we entertain in the text. Firms can obtain bank advice on the merits of acquisition deals by entering into short-term contracts for this purpose. Our results indicate that acquired firms tended to establish more long-term arms-length relationships of the sort interlocks can facilitate before they were acquired-relationships that expose a firm to outside influence at the highest level of decision-making authority. Indeed, the interlock relationships maintained by firms that were acquired in the 1960s appeared to have been in place long before the combinations in question. no way of knowing whether the managerial inefficiency reflected in low q-ratios is the result of opportunism, which is the focus of agency theory, or simple ineptitude, which is the focus of more traditional economic arguments.
Large firms were less likely to be acquired through friendly means than were small firms in the 1960s, although large size was unrelated to the likelihood of predatory acquisition ( Table 2 ). The effect of size on the likelihood of a friendly acquisition was by a wide margin the second largest observedcorporations that fell in the 5th percentile of firms in our sample with respect to size were 1,879 times more likely to become friendly acquisition partners than those that fell in the 95th percentile (Table 3 ). Analogous to the q-ratio effect, this extremely large difference can be attributed to the fact that very large firms were essentially bypassed for friendly acquisition-the smallest Top 500 firms were just twice as likely as the median firm to be acquired. This suggests that large size posed a barrier to the friendly acquisition of corporations in the 1960s, perhaps because of the capital requirements it placed on potential acquirers. But as some observers have noted, size was not a significant barrier in the case of predatory acquisitions (Steiner 1975 ). Indeed, some scholars believe that a primary purpose of predatory tactics was to help small firms overcome the economic, social, and political power of their larger corporate targets (Hirsch 1986 ).
High price/earnings ratios may have decreased a firm's chance of friendly acquisition in the 1960s, but they were unrelated to the probability of predatory acquisition. The effect of the price/earnings ratio on the likelihood of a friendly acquisition approached statistical significance at the p < .05 level in the full model and cleared this hurdle in the parsimonious model (Table 2) . Corporations whose price/earnings ratios fell in the 5th percentile of firms in our sample were 6.45 times more likely to become friendly acquisition partners than those with price/earnings ratios in the 95th percentile (Table 3) . Although consistent with received wisdom, this is the first reported evidence of an effect of price/earnings ratio on the likelihood of acquisition. It suggests that the desire to "dress-up" earnings figures by purchasing the cheap profits of other firms motivated friendly acquisitions in the 1960s.
Contrary to prediction, high performance in the form of return on equity increased a corporation's chance of friendly acquisition in the 1960s, but had no effect on the probability of a predatory acquisition (Table 2) . This effect, though, was among the smallest observed for the likelihood of a friendly acquisition-corporations with return-on-equity ratios in the 95th percentile of firms in our sample were only 1.65 times more likely to become friendly acquisition partners than those that fell in the 5th percentile (Table 3) Finally, concentrating production in an industry in which many firms had been acquired in the last year increased a corporation's chance of predatory acquisition in the 1960s, but had no effect on the chance of friendly acquisition. Producing in an industry in which many firms had been acquired since the beginning of the study period (not counting the last year) decreased a corporation's chance of friendly acquisition, but had no effect on its chance of predatory acquisition (Table 2 ). The effect of recent acquisitions was relatively modest-corporations producing in industries in which the number of recent acquisitions fell in the 95th percentile were 4.71 times more likely to become victims of a predatory takeover than were those producing in industries in which the number of recent acquisitions fell in the 5th percentile. The effect of prior acquisitions was more substantial-the ratio of the acquisition rate for firms in the 95th percentile as opposed to the 5th percentile with respect to prior acquisitions was 9.63 (Table 3) The embeddedness of corporate managers in ownership relationships also influenced the pattern of corporate acquisitions in the 1 960s. Our results suggest that firms whose stock was closely held by groups represented in management were reluctant to join in friendly acquisitions. Further, predators were inclined to pass over management-owned corporations and firms with insider-dominated boards of directors. The fact that concentrated ownership affected the likelihood of acquisition only when it was in the hands of management suggests that block stockholders who were less involved in a firm's day-to-day decisionmaking had interests and capacities similar to those of dispersed stockholders. These results are consistent with managerialist, agency, and power-structure theory interpre-21 A crude analysis (not reported but available on request from the first author) that distinguished only between conglomerate and nonconglomerate acquisitions indicates that the three dimensions of resource dependence studied here influenced diversifying and nondiversifying acquisitions in the same way (Barber et al. 1995) . 22 Recent studies have provided firm-level support for the resource dependence view in connection with other organizational behaviors, most notably, patterns of political contributions (Mizruchi and Koenig 1986; Mizruchi 1989 Mizruchi , 1990 and decisions regarding the location of production facilities (Romo and Schwartz forthcoming). tations of stock ownership by managers. Owner-managers in the 1960s may have been less enamored with growth-related salary gains, had a greater affective attachment to their firms, been less prone to opportunistic behavior, and been better able to mount credible takeover defenses than were professional managers. Our results on the proportion of insiders on a firm's board of directors, however, are more consistent with the powerstructure view than the managerialist and agency theory accounts. A high proportion of insiders on a firm's board of directors apparently shielded top managers against external threats to their control.
Finally, the embeddedness of corporate directors in the business-elite network also influenced a firm's chance of friendly or predatory acquisition in the 1960s-although the strongest of the four predicted interlock effects were only modest in magnitude. Corporations that maintained many interlocks to other firms-in particular, received interlocks to commercial banks-were more likely to be acquired, presumably because the outside directors on their boards disseminated information about their willingness and suitability for acquisition to prospective acquirers. Firms that maintained many neutral interlocks to commercial banks were better able to avoid predatory takeover, presumably because their finance capitalist outside directors provided them with information and influence useful in mounting credible defenses against a takeover.
Overall, then, it seems that established managers and directors were in a better position than less established elites to defend their firms against predatory takeovers in the 1960s-a tactical innovation that violated the norms and threatened to disrupt the power structure of American business. Centrality in both the ownership relations of the firm and the social network of the business elite provided some protection against unwanted acquisition. Still, the lone and modest negative effect of neutral commercial bank interlocks on the likelihood of a predatory acquisition suggests that interlocks provided firms with relatively little protection against unwanted acquisition. Perhaps this is because predatory acquisitions in this period were often initiated by relative outsiders among the business elite. Of the 37 Top 500 corporations acquired subsequent to predatory bids, 22 were acquired by a predator (the remaining 15 were acquired by white knights). And of these 22 corporations, 15 were acquired by firms not among the Top 500 in 1962. Interlocking directorates were hypothesized to reduce a firm's chance of predatory acquisition partly by providing it with an opportunity to monitor and control deviant corporate elites. However, because small firms tend to maintain fewer interlocks, the leaders of predatory firms may have been relatively unencumbered by interlock connections. The fact that interlocks did not provide greater protection from predatory takeover may explain why business elites favored passage of the Williams Act of 1968, which regulated the use of interfirm tender offers. The corporate elite's apparatus for resolving internal disputes was ineffective in regulating a behavior perpetrated by actors who came from its periphery. This may be one case in which state intervention was necessary to organize the interests of the capitalist class as a whole (Poulantzas 1973; Block 1977 ).
Ownership Relations and the Business Elite Network
Recently, theory outlining the effects of ownership relations and business elite networks on corporate behavior has been called into question. Studying the largest 100 corporations in the 1970s, Fligstein and Brantley (1992) found no relation between a firm's mode of control, as measured by the largest percentage of stock held by an individual or group, and its strategy, financial and organizational structure, acquisitiveness, or performance. They also found little relation between interlocks with banks (apparently indicated by an aggregate measure of received, sent, and neutral bank interlocks) and the wide range of corporate behaviors studied. Studying the largest 500 corporations in 1980, Davis and Stout (1992) found that ownership concentration, measured by a dummy variable indicating that a single individual or group of related persons owned more than 5 percent of a firm's stock, reduced a firm's chance of hostile acquisition, but did not influence its chance of acquisition in general. They also found corporate interlocks, measured by the total number of interlocks a firm maintained and a dummy variable indicating the presence of a banker on its board, had no effect on the likelihood of acquisition.
Fligstein and Brantley (1992) concluded from their study that "organizational and not ... ownership embeddedness is likely to be a more important cause of actions of firms than anything else" (p. 303). Further, they add, "we should abandon our concentration on board[s] of directors as a source of network data, in general, and financial linkages across boards of directors, in particular, unless their possible relevance can be specified theoretically" (p. 304). Stinchcombe (1990) We find that ownership relations and network ties among the business elite had a significant impact on acquisition behavior in the 1960s. Further, we maintain that our results in this regard, which contradict recent critiques, are not the product of our focus on an unusual historical period but instead are the consequence of our more precise measurement of crucial theoretical constructs. We do not contend, however, that the significance of ownership relations and ties among the business elite is temporally invariant. In fact, we suspect that the impact of interlock connections on the likelihood of acquisition was 23 This source uses information from the business press (e.g., articles in The Wall Street Journal) in addition to data from the more standard sources available at the time (e.g., proxy statements) to identify both the existence of large blocks of stockholders and the kinship-business relationships linking them-identifying blocks of stock under the control of single decision-making entities that would otherwise go undetected. quite different in the massive wave of mergers in the 1980s as the market for corporate control became legitimated and formalized. In that period, central members of the business elite were more accepting of predatory takeover tactics, and investment banks expanded their roles as brokers in the corporate marriage market. As a result, the modest negative effect of neutral commercial bank interlocks on the likelihood of a predatory acquisition observed here for the 1960s may have disappeared by the 1980s, while the positive effect of directional investment bank interlocks on the likelihood of a friendly acquisition may have increased.
Economic and Social Embeddedness Accounts of Acquisitions
While the traditional economic view and social embeddedness accounts of corporate acquisitions may rest on different assumptions (e.g., an atomized as opposed to a relational conception of managers and firms) and emphasize different processes (e.g., maximization of shareholder wealth as opposed to maintenance of elite power), the two may be compatible. In fact, one variant of the embeddedness perspective not evaluated here draws on elements of the "new institutionalism" in organization theory (Powell and DiMaggio 1991) and has the same empirical implications as the economic view. Fligstein (1990) maintains that a corporation's behavior is largely shaped by the "conception of control" in which its top managers are imbued. The finance conception of control predominated in the 1960s. Managers steeped in it viewed corporations as bundles of investments to be bought and sold and evaluated acquisition opportunities on the basis of the stock market gains they might generate (Fligstein 1990:226, 242, 247, 250). Thus, Fligstein's embeddedness account would also expect the market valuation, price/earnings ratio, and profitability of firms to influence their chances of acquisition. Interestingly, Fligstein also maintained that firms that did not embrace the finance conception of control-as indicated by their dominant product strategy, functional structure, low growth rate, and disinterest in acquisitions, as well as the nonfinancial background of their chief executive officers-were at greater risk of acquisition in the 1960s (Fligstein 1990 :229, 260, 289, 291). However, our auxiliary analyses (not reported but available on request from the first author) indicate that diversified and divisionalized firms that were growing rapidly through corporate acquisitions and that were led by chief executive officers with finance backgrounds were no less likely to be acquired in the 1960s than were other firms. This is not to say that Fligstein's version of the new institutional account of corporate behavior provides nothing new in addition to the economic explanation of mergers. We strongly suspect that institutional processes shaped the extent to which and manner in which corporations acquired other firms in the 1960s. In fact, two studies already suggest just this (Fligstein and Brantley 1992; Haunschild 1993).
Further, to the extent that the social embeddedness and traditional economic accounts of corporate behavior differ in their empirical predictions, they may still be complementary. On the one hand, the empirical tendencies apprehended by each perspective may operate orthogonally to one another. For example, corporate executives may simultaneously maximize shareholder wealth (as manifested in high q-ratios) while establishing ties among the elite that allow them to pursue attractive suitors and escape feared predators. On the other hand, the empirical tendencies apprehended by each perspective may be interrelated. For example, our theoretical arguments imply that stock ownership by inside directors reduces a firm's chance of predatory acquisition directly, by inhibiting potential predators' purchase of its stock (a social embeddedness effect), and indirectly, through its association with policies that maximize stockholder wealth (an economic effect). The four authors are currently collaborating on a study of the friendly and predatory acquirers of firms during the 1960s. 25 We do not feature this split-sample result more prominently because we cannot reliably replicate it separately for friendly and predatory acquisitions. To do so would require dissaggregating our 71 acquired firms into four categories (management-owned friendly partners, management-owned targets of predators, nonmanagement-owned friendly partners, and nonmanagement-owned targets of predators), the analyses of which in each case would be based on a very small number of events. In fact, we are cautious in our interpretation of the results of the splitsample analyses that combine predatory and friendly acquisitions. Distinguishing between nonmanagement-owned and management-owned firms creates subsamples of 285 and 193 firms, respectively, and only 15 of the 193 managementowned firms were acquired in our period. The low ratio of events to observations reduces the power of our statistical methods.
